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IS BURGLARY A FELONY OR MISDEMEANOR
IN MARYLAND?
Copeland v. Warden1
The appellant-petitioner-convict appealed from the trial
court's refusal to issue the writ of habeas corpus sought
against the appellee, Warden of the State House of Correction, where appellant was detained after being convicted of
the crime of "burglary". The appellant's contention was
that the crime for which he had been tried was of the grade
of felony, but that because he had not been arraigned, his
conviction was defective and that therefore he could seek
release on habeas corpus. The Court denied leave to prosecute the appeal, and thus affirmed.
While this note does not question the ultimate correctness of the Court's ruling in denying habeas corpus, it
should be pointed out that the language of the Court on the
particular point involved is subject to question. The Court
said, in a very brief per curiam opinion:
"The record shows that the petitioner was convicted
of burglary, but the indictment is not before us, and we
are unable to determine exactly what the charge was.
Burglary, under the Maryland statute, Article 27, Section 33, is not a felony. Bowser v. State, 136 Md. 342,
344. Whether he was indicted under this section or
whether he was indicted for the common law offense of
State of Maryland, ex rel. Copeland v. Warden of Maryland House of
Correction, 70 A. 2d 813 (Md. 1950). In the present appeal the petitioner
also contended that he was not assigned counsel nor given time to get
counsel. The Court rejected those contentions because the record did not
show that he had requested the appointment of counsel or a postponement
in order to obtain his own counsel, so that he was not denied any right on
that score. This was the second time that this petitioner had sought habeas
corpus and had taken the case to the Court of -Appeals. The earlier case was
Frank Copeland v. J. Leroy Wright, Warden, 188 Md. W6, 53 A. 2d 5.53
(1947). In the former case, the Court turned down his petition for habeas
corpus, where he had tried to use the writ (1) to review the legal sufficiency
of the evidence on disputed facts, and (2) to contend that he had been tried
without two witnesses in his behalf. The Court pointed out that the witnesses had been summoned, and their names called at the trial, but they

did not answer, and that there was no allegation why they were not present.
The Court held that, while an accused is entitled to witnesses if they can
be found, their attendance is not guaranteed, although under proper circumstances the trial can be delayed while efforts are made to get witnesses
whose appearance is essential. It not having appeared that such course was
suggested by the defendant, he did not make a showing that he had been
deprived of any right for that reason.
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breaking and entering in the night-time,' does not appear. There is no right of arraignment for a misdemeanor. Basta v. State, 133 Md. 568. Under these circumstances we are unable to find that he was denied any
right to which he was entitled."
As a preface to discussion of the validity of the Court's
comment on the burglary and similar law of the State, it
may be well to survey the relevant statutory sections as
they are now numbered
in the State Code and the most re3
cent Supplement.
Article 27, Section 32, merely fixes the punishment for
the common law crime of burglary. Section 334 expands
the definition of the crime of common law burglary to include breaking and entering a dwelling house in the nighttime with intent to steal personal property of any value.
This clarifies the case law rule' that one need not intend as
such to steal property of the value required for the felony of
grand larceny in order to be a burglar, so long as he intends
to steal any property. Section 33A in the Supplement,
provides, and permits the use of, a short form of indictment
for burglary.
Section 34, also amended in the Supplement, denounces,
and fixes the punishment for, the separate crime of breaking a dwelling house in the day-time with various intents,
i.e., to commit murder or felony, or with intent to steal
property of any value; or of breaking a storehouse or other
described premises either by day or by night with intent
to commit murder or felony, or steal property of the value
of $25 or more. This was the section which the Bowser
case, cited herein by the Court, said made the offense only
a misdemeanor, and not burglary or a felony.
There is therein a certain overlap with Section 389, as
also amended in the Supplement, for this section makes it
a misdemeanor to break into any building not contiguous to
$ Section 33, as mentioned below, infra, notes 4 and 5, refers to the nighttime, and otherwise integrates the elements of the common law offense of
burglary, and only clarifies the point as to the intent to steal property of
minimum
value.
8
There have been no changes in the legislation since the most recent
Supplement, that of 1947.
'The present discussion Is in terms of the Section 33 of the current Md.
Code (1939), Art. 27. At the time of the Bowser case, what is now Md. Code
(1939) and Code Supp. (1947), Art. 27, Sec. 34 was then Md. Code (1912),
Art. 27, Sec. 33. May It not be that a confusion of the two different sections
numbered 33 ispart of the complication now under discussion, especially as
the present Section 33 specifically says a violator thereof Is a felon.
SState v. Wiley, 173 Md. 119, 194 A. 629, 113 A. L. R. 1267 (1937).
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a mansion house with intent to steal goods of the value of
less than $25, or to break into any such premises and actually steal goods worth less than One Dollar. This section
apparently applies regardless of the time of day, although
that is not specifically set out.
Section 35, also amended in the Supplement, denounces
the apparent misdemeanor of breaking into certain described premises not contiguous to any mansion house and
stealing therefrom goods valued at more than One Dollar.
This section was not involved in the case under discussion,
nor were Sections 36 and 37, having to do with "burglary"
with the use of explosives. Rather this discussion is concerned with contrasting the various common law and statutory crimes that punish breaking and/or entering various
premises at various times of the day or night with various
intents, whether the intent be executed or not. The common law crime of burglary was limited to dwelling houses,
required both a breaking and an entering, in the night time,
and an intent to commit felony, although the intent did not
have to be executed.
Consequently, it would seem that, for the purposes of
this discussion, Maryland has a modified common law felony
of burglary, as found in Sections 32 and 33; and statutory
misdemeanor crimes of house breaking by day; or store or
other breaking at any time; or breaking into non-dwelling
premises followed-by stealing, under Sections 34, 35 and 389.
The essential difference would be between the modified
common law felony of burglary, and the entirely statutory
crimes, misdemeanors, of other breakings as the statutes
provide. In the case under discussion the Court said dogmatically that the petitioner was convicted of "burglary",
although it admits that the record did not show exactly
what the charge was, and went on further to say that
"burglary" under the Maryland statute (citing Section 33)
is not a felony. It should be pointed out that Section 33,
which merely modifies the common law crime of burglary,
includes the phrase "shall be deemed a felon", and further
provides that the offender shall be guilty of "burglary".
Perhaps the Court mistakenly was talking about Section
34, as modified by Section 35, discussed above, particularly
in view of the fact that they cited the Bowser case, which
really was concerned with the earlier version of the present
Section 34. To be sure, the Bowser case did decide that a
violator of the present Section 34 was not a felon but only a
misdemeanant. The problem arose in connection with the
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matter of the necessary allegations in the indictment, going
off on whether the crime in question was a felony or a misdemeanor, and the Court there decided that the statutory
crime of day-time house breaking or of store breaking at
was not a felony for reasons appropriate to that
any time
6
case.
The Bowser case in fact was directed to the very point of
whether the statutory crime of day-time house breaking or
store breaking was tantamount to burglary, and if so, a
felony, or not so tantamount, and therefore only a misdemeanor. The Court specifically decided in the Bowser case
that because day-time house breaking or store breaking at
any time was not the same thing as burglary, it was only a
misdemeanor. But, had they been able to find that it had
been the legislative intent to make that separate crime tantamount to burglary, then it would have been ipso facto a
felony, for the reason that burglary was a felony at common
law, and still is a felony, as witness the specific language of
the 1937 Legislature in enacting the addendum of Section
33 to the much older provision for the punishment of common law burglary which is found in Section 32.
The logic of the Bowser case was that the fact that the
newly enacted day-time house breaking and store breaking
section was placed next to the then only other provision
for common law burglary, under the joint title of "Burglary", did not place crimes under the new statute on the
same level with common law burglary, or make them
felonies.
The Court specifically ruled that a crime is not a felony
merely because it is called burglary, or is put under the
same general label. This case decided that there is an essential distinction between burglary as at common law,
and a statutory "something else", which latter is what the
On the felony-misdemeanor distinction, particularly with reference to the
ritual of the indictment, see Whittington v. State, 173 Md. 387, 196 A. 314
(1938). noted. Error In Charging A Misdemeanor As A Felony. 2 Md. L. Rev.

284 (1938). Further on the ritual of the indictment, depending on whether
felony or misdemeanor, see Barber v. State, 50 Md. 161 (1878) : and Bowser
v. State, 136 Md. ,342, 110 A. 854 (1920). cited by the Court in the principal
case: and also Dutton v. State. 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914). This last
case involved the same point as the case under discussion, whether the
defendant was entitled to arraignment for the specific charge. On appeal
from the actual conviction, the case was affirmed on that particular point,
although reversed for other grounds, 'because as the law then stood, although
the possible sentence was a capital one, which had been imposed, the crime
was only a misdemeanor for which there was no rirlht of arraignment anyhow. By subsequent legislation, the specific rule of the Putton ease has heen
changed and the particular crime in question, attempted rape. iq now recognized as a felony. Maryland Code Supp. (1947), Art. 27, Sec. 13.
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Court found the Legislature had intended in making a
separate crime for day-time house breaking and store breaking. So, it would seem inappropriate now to merge the two
crimes under the name of burglary when the Court had
earlier specifically rejected such a contention in the Bowser
case.
Beyond the point of Maryland felony-misdemeanor law,
which is the theme of this discussion, the Court's opinion
might be commented upon further in that it said, as pointed
out above, that it was doubtful under the record before it
whether Copeland was indicted under the Section it was
thinking of or for the "common law offense of breaking and
entering in the night-time". It might be remarked that the
name "burglary" is customarily applied to the "common
law offense of breaking and entering in the night-time"' ,
and some other name is usually worked out for statutory
variations which denounce other offenses that did not come
within the definition of common law burglary or any modified version thereof. This seems to be the particular point
in the Bowser case, that the offense of house breaking by
day or store breaking at any time (now Section 34; Section
33 of the 1912 Code) is an entirely new offense different
from common law burglary, and not even a modification of
that common law crime, as does seem to be the intent of
the now Section 33 cited above.
It could be mentioned that, if the record was not clear,
the Court could have placed its affirmance on the ground
that there was not a sufficient record to make it necessary
to rule on the point. On the other hand, it could be argued
that all doubts should have been resolved in the petitioner's
favor, so that the "record" notation that the charge was
"burglary" would then have been held to mean the common
law felony of burglary, rather than some other quasi-burglary crime which is only a misdemeanor. Then, if the Court
really felt that lack of arraignment in a felony case could be
tested by habeas corpus, it could have affirmed by taking a
stand on whether arraignment, even if the crime be a felony,
is such a substantial right that the lack of it can be later
tested by habeas corpus.
On this the present writer takes no stand, but it would
seem to be plausible to rule that even if the crime were
demonstrated to have been really a felonious crime, which
is another point of confusion, the lack of arraignment would
only be a ground for appeal and could not later be tested by
7CLARK AND MA nRALL, CaMES

(4th Ed., 1940), See. 401.
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habeas corpus, any more than any other routine error in the
normal trial of the case.'
These are merely passing suggestions, but going back to
the main theme of the case, the point remains that the dogmatic statement that "burglary, under the Maryland statute,
... is not a felony" can not be substantiated in the light of
history, and that the citation of the Bowser case is actually
in reverse, for that the Bowser case specifically decided that
the statutory crimes of day-time housebreaking and storebreaking at any time are only misdemeanors, whereas
common law burglary, as modified by statute, is a felony.
'Compare the recent case of State ex rel. Ballam v. Warden of Maryland
House of Correction, 75 A. 2d 95 (Md. 1950), in which the Court of Appeals
denied leave to appeal from refusal of a writ of habeas corpus where the
petitioner claimed he was denied constitutional rights because he was misinformed of the true nature of the charges against him and did not receive a
copy of the indictment as required by Md. Laws 1949, Ch. 757, adding Art. 27,
Sec. 647A to Md. Code (1939), now Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, 1. The Court ruled that the failure to grant him a copy of the indictment would not entitle him to release on habeas corpus. The Court also
ruled in that case that the failure of the trial judge to file a substantial but
succinct statement setting forth the grounds of the application, the questions
involved, and the reasons for action taken, was not jurisdictional, but only
intended to help the Court of Appeals in disposing of the case.
On the general question of whether arraignment is such a substantial right
that it can be tested by habeas corpus and Is not merely lmited to appeal
from the criminal conviction itself, the case of Basta v. State, 133 Md. 568,
572, 105 A. 773 (1919), cited by the Court In the principal case. contains
strong language as to the importance of the right of arraignment in felony
cases. However, it does not contribute too much to the solution of the:
problem whether the deprival of it is so substantial that it may be tested by
habeas corpus.
On the respective questions of arraignment, copy of indictment, and right
to counsel, variously concerned in the principal and other cases cited, it
should be noted that Rule 1 of the new Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, promulgated by the Court of Appeals and in effect since January 1,
1950, treats of these various matters, although without solution of the
problem whether the deprival of any one of these privileges is so substantial
that it may be tested by habeas corpus. In fact it is not too clear under
Rule 1 whether arraignment is even now, such a requirement as to allow an
appeal from conviction in both misdemeanor and felony cases. The Rule
merely provides how arraignment shall be conducted, and incorporates the
statutory rule cited above as to furnishing a copy of the indictment. It
further provides that if the defendant appears in court without counsel, the
court shall advise him of his right to obtain counsel, and that unless he
elects to proceed without counsel, the court shall in all capital and all
serious cases assign counsel to defend him. Subsection (c) of the rule provides that the record shall affirmatively show compliance with the rule.
This, no doubt, applies to all of the requirements mentioned above, and the
requirement for affirmative showing may suggest some answer to the question here discussed, as to whether the non-compliance is so jurisdictional as
to entitle the accused to release on habeas corpus, even though the point
was not raised by an appeal from the conviction.

